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ESSAY 
ESSENTIALLY ELECTIVE: THE LAW AND IDEOLOGY OF 
RESTRICTING ABORTION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
B. Jessie Hill* 
INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has put on full display the physical and 
doctrinal isolation of abortion from health care more generally.1 In early 
2020, several states proclaimed that abortions had to be stopped or 
delayed for lengthy or indefinite periods of time in order to help fight the 
pandemic. Those actions provoked litigation seeking emergency relief to 
keep abortion clinics open.2 No similar lawsuits have been necessary to 
protect access to other medical procedures. So why was abortion singled 
out for disparate treatment? 
 
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Judge Ben C. Green Professor 
of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Jonathan Entin, and Liz Sepper for excellent comments and suggestions. 
1 See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical 
Perspective, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 833, 837–40 (1999); B. Jessie Hill, The First Amendment and 
the Politics of Reproductive Health Care, 50 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 103, 103–04 (2016). 
2 The states in which litigation occurred are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Not all of the litigation has resulted in 
published opinions. I was involved as counsel in the litigation surrounding Ohio’s order and 
its application to abortion providers. Ohio was the first state to seek to enforce an elective-
surgeries order against abortion clinics. Greer Donley, Beatrice A. Chen & Sonya Borrero, 
The Legal and Medical Necessity of Abortion Care amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, J.L. & 
Biosciences (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8–9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?-
abstract_id=3584728 [https://perma.cc/QL85-XHKQ]. 
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This Essay provides an overview of the litigation that ensued in the 
wake of some states’ attempts to limit abortion access under the  
authority of executive orders limiting “non-essential,” “non-urgent,” or 
“elective” medical and surgical procedures. It argues that “abortion 
exceptionalism”—that is, “the tendency of legislatures and courts to 
subject abortion to unique, and uniquely burdensome, rules”—came into 
play in two ways.3 First, the COVID-19 crisis allowed anti-abortion 
officials to rely on the narrow meaning of “elective” in the abortion 
context, as well as underlying ambiguity about the meaning of “elective,” 
to argue that abortions are medically unnecessary and can be halted 
indefinitely during a pandemic. Second, and relatedly, they used the 
exceptional treatment of abortion and the longstanding ambivalence about 
the place of abortion within health care to argue that abortion providers’ 
demands to be treated like every other health care provider under these 
executive orders was in fact a claim for special treatment. This Essay ends 
by suggesting that, for long-term protection of abortion rights, abortion 
must be reframed as a medically necessary and appropriate treatment, and 
it must be rhetorically re-incorporated into health care more generally.  
I. LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF COVID-19 ABORTION LITIGATION 
A. The Orders 
In a handful of states, shifting executive and judicial interpretations of 
orders banning non-urgent or elective surgeries resulted in a whiplash-
inducing series of legal maneuvers and highly unstable circumstances on 
the ground for those seeking to access or provide abortion services during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. This controversy arose because, in mid-March 
2020, states had begun adopting orders to limit the medical and/or 
surgical procedures that could be performed during the declared 
coronavirus emergency.4 Broadly speaking, these orders were supported 
 
3 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 1047, 1048 (2014); Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 1175, 1177 (2014); Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How 
Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 1, 3 
(2012). This exceptionalism permeates abortion doctrine. For example, Professor Caroline 
Mala Corbin has described how courts set aside traditional free speech principles under the 
First Amendment when abortion-related speech is involved. Corbin, supra, at 1190–92. 
4 See, e.g., Ohio Dep’t of Health, Director’s Order for the Management of Non-Essential 
Surgeries and Procedures Throughout Ohio (Mar. 17, 2020) (rescinded Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/resources/public-health-orders/direct-
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by three justifications: (1) preserving hospital capacity in light of the 
likely influx of critically ill coronavirus patients; (2) conserving personal 
protective equipment (PPE), such as masks, gloves, and gowns, in short 
supply due to the pandemic; and (3) reducing the possibility of 
community spread of the virus by minimizing unnecessary provider-
patient interactions.5 
The question of how such orders should apply to abortion procedures 
arose almost immediately. On March 18, 2020, numerous professional 
organizations, including the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (“ACOG”), issued a statement affirming that abortion is 
essential, time-sensitive health care that should not be delayed during a 
pandemic.6 That statement noted: “[A] delay of several weeks, or in some 
cases days, may increase the risks or potentially make [abortion] 
completely inaccessible. The consequences of being unable to obtain an 
abortion profoundly impact a person’s life, health, and well-being.”7 
Similarly, the American Medical Association issued a short statement on 
March 30, 2020, condemning the politicization of reproductive health 
care during the pandemic and asserting that “physicians—not 
politicians—should be the ones deciding which procedures are urgent-
emergent and need to be performed, and which ones can wait, in 
partnership with our patients.”8 
 
ors-order-non-essential-surgery-3-17-2020 [https://perma.cc/SXX3-2WTE]; Tex. Governor 
Greg Abbott, Executive Order GA-09 (Mar. 22, 2020) (superseded Apr. 17, 2020 by GA-15), 
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA_09_COVID-19_hospital_capacity_IMA-
GE_03-22-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z876-HNLV]; W. Va. Exec. Dep’t, Executive Order 
16-20 (Mar. 31, 2020), https://governor.wv.gov/Documents/EO%2016-20electivepro-
cedures.pdf. [https://perma.cc/KS6A-FQ5E].  
5 See sources cited supra note 4; see also, e.g., Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1181 
(11th Cir. 2020) (summarizing the state of Alabama’s justifications for its abortion restrictions 
related to the COVID-19 pandemic). 
6 ACOG et al., Joint Statement on Abortion Access During the COVID-19 Outbreak (Mar. 
18, 2020), https://www.acog.org/news/news-releases/2020/03/joint-statement-on-abortion-
access-during-the-covid-19-outbreak [https://perma.cc/T8CA-K9QS]. This statement was 
joined by the American Board of Obstetrics & Gynecology, together with the American 
Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists, the American Gynecological & Obstetrical 
Society, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the Society for Academic 
Specialists in General Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Society of Family Planning, and the 
Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine. 
7 Id.  
8 Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Statement on Government Interference in Reproductive Health 
Care (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/ama-statements/ama-statement-
government-interference-reproductive-health-care [https://perma.cc/6SAC-PJD5]. 
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Several governors and other officials took the opposite tack, declaring 
that most “surgical” abortions—and in some cases even medication-
induced abortions—must cease, at least temporarily, during the 
pandemic.9 For example, Mississippi Governor Tate Reeves claimed that 
his executive order banning “elective procedures” would prevent 
abortions, just like the Texas order it was modeled upon.10 In Oklahoma, 
the governor declared that all abortions, except emergent procedures or 
those necessary to avert a serious medical risk, would be suspended under 
a similar order.11 In Ohio, abortion clinics initially believed they were 
allowed to continue providing services under the non-essential surgery 
order, since “time sensitive” procedures were permitted.12 But not long 
after the order became effective, anti-abortion activists began calling 
abortion clinics to determine whether they were open, and then advocated 
with state officials to obtain an interpretation of the order that would halt 
abortions.13 These efforts found success with the Ohio Attorney General, 
who subsequently issued cease and desist orders to several Ohio clinics.14 
In Ohio, as in several other states, litigation ensued. 
B. The Litigation 
For the most part, courts decided that it was unconstitutional for states 
to ban nearly all abortions under the orders that were designed to 
minimize interpersonal contact, preserve PPE, and manage hospital 
 
9 Abortions may be performed medically or surgically. Medication-induced abortions 
require only the taking of pills and are available through approximately ten weeks of 
pregnancy. So-called “surgical” abortions, which are available both early and later in 
pregnancy, are not surgeries in the traditional sense, since they do not usually involve any 
incision or a sterile opening. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 
2316 (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016). 
10 Ashton Pittman, Governor Attempts To Ban Mississippi Abortions, Citing Need To 
Preserve PPE, Jackson Free Press (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/-
news/2020/apr/10/governor-bans-abortions-mississippi-claiming-need-/ [https://perma.cc/S-
CR5-9PE4]. 
11 Ryan Sharp & Carmen Forman, Gov. Kevin Stitt Says Abortions Included in Suspended 
Elective Surgeries, Oklahoman (Mar. 27, 2020), https://oklahoman.com/article/-
5658751/governors-office-clarifies-executive-order-to-include-abortions [https://perma.cc/-
3CJ3-3326]. 
12 Ohio Dep’t of Health, supra note 4.  
13 CreatedEqualFilms, #StopTheSpread: Abortion Centers Pose Serious Health Risk of 
COVID-19 Spread, YouTube (Mar. 20, 2020), https://youtu.be/KKROXMyZ18A 
[https://perma.cc/LW2J-T5SH].  
14 Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *3 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020). 
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capacity. District courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, and Texas all granted temporary relief against attempts to 
enforce the orders so as to prevent abortions in all but the most limited 
circumstances, such as where the pregnant patient’s life is in danger.15 
Appeals courts were more of a mixed bag, with the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits permitting only a narrow subset of abortions to continue, whereas 
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits found a wider range of abortion 
procedures to be constitutionally protected, even during the pandemic. 
The state surgery orders all differed somewhat in their wording and 
their duration.16 For example, most orders banned “elective” or “non-
essential” surgeries but then listed several criteria to define those terms—
generally in such a way that time-sensitive procedures could still go 
forward. A small number prohibited all “procedures” with the exception 
of those that are “immediately medically necessary” or those necessary to 
treat “an emergency medical condition.”17 Moreover, most orders referred 
to surgeries and medical “procedures”; as such they appeared only to limit 
surgical abortions, although they were interpreted in some states to 
encompass medication abortion as well.18 Some orders were designed to 
 
15 Preterm-Cleveland, 2020 WL 1957173, at *17 (granting preliminary injunction); S. Wind 
Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. 20-CV-00277, 2020 WL 1932900, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 
20, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction); Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, No. 3:15-CV-
00705, 2020 WL 1905147, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2020) (granting preliminary 
injunction), aff’d as modified, 956 F.3d 913 (6th Cir. 2020), modified, No. 3:15-CV-00705, 
2020 WL 2026986 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2020); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. 
Rutledge, No. 4:19-CV-00449, 2020 WL 1862830, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 2020) (granting 
temporary restraining order), order vacated in part, No. 4:19-CV-00449, 2020 WL 2079224 
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 22, 2020); Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at 
*16 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction); Planned Parenthood Ctr. for 
Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-00323, 2020 WL 1815587, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020) 
(granting temporary restraining order), mandamus granted, order vacated in part sub nom. In 
re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020). 
16 A helpful chart can be found in Donley, Chen & Borrero, supra note 2, at 6–8.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 4. In Texas, for instance, the district court issued a temporary restraining order 
enjoining the state from banning medication abortion during the pandemic. Planned 
Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-00323, 2020 WL 1502102, at *4 (W.D. 
Tex. Mar. 30, 2020). After the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the injunction, see In re 
Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 779 (5th Cir. 2020), the plaintiff clinics moved for a second temporary 
restraining order, resulting in a narrower injunction that blocked the order from being applied 
to, inter alia, medication abortions. Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice, 2020 WL 1815587, 
at *7. After the Fifth Circuit stayed that injunction, see In re Abbott, 800 F. App’x 293, 296 
(5th Cir. 2020), Planned Parenthood asked the U.S. Supreme Court for an emergency order 
vacating the stay as applied to medication abortions. Emergency Application to Justice Alito 
To Vacate Administrative Stay of Temporary Restraining Order Entered by the United States 
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stay in effect until they were rescinded, whereas others had set expiration 
dates.19  
Where states interpreted their orders to prohibit abortion, courts’ 
differing understandings and applications of the relevant doctrinal 
framework dictated whether those abortion bans were found to be 
constitutional. In particular, courts differed in how they understood the 
key Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the government’s public 
health powers in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,20 and its interaction with the 
key abortion-rights precedents in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey21 and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.22 
Casey, of course, stands for the proposition that the state may not prevent 
a pregnant person from accessing abortion altogether before viability, nor 
may it impose an “undue burden” on the ability to do so.23 Whole 
Woman’s Health clarified that courts applying this standard should 
balance the asserted health benefits of the law against the law’s burdens 
on abortion access; if the benefits are outweighed by the burdens, then the 
 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 1, Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. 
19A1019 (Apr. 11, 2020). Before the Supreme Court could act, the Fifth Circuit dissolved its 
own stay only as applied to medication abortions, finding that it was unclear whether the 
Governor’s order was meant to prohibit them. In re Abbott, 809 F. App’x 200, 202–03 (5th 
Cir. 2020). Subsequently, however, that same court issued an opinion holding the second 
temporary restraining order invalid and allowing the state to prohibit all abortions (including 
medication abortions), except for women whose pregnancies were close to the legal limit for 
obtaining a pre-viability abortion. Abbott, 956 F.3d at 724. 
19 Compare, e.g., La. Dep’t of Health, Healthcare Facility Notice/Order #2020-COVID19-
All-007, at 2 (Mar. 21, 2020), http://ldh.la.gov/assets/oph/Coronavirus/resources/-
providers/LDH-UPDATED-Notice-Med-Surg-Procedures32120.pdf [https://perma.cc/K94T-
YB6S] (stating the order would remain in effect “until further notice”), and Ohio Dep’t of 
Health, supra note 4 (stating the order would remain in effect until the state of emergency no 
longer exists or the order is rescinded or modified), with Tex. Governor Greg Abbott, supra 
note 4 (specifying an expiration date of Apr. 21, 2020). 
20 197 U.S. 11, 22–23 (1905). 
21 505 U.S. 833, 844–45 (1992). 
22 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016). 
23 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–74; see also Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (same). 
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burden is “undue.”24 In addition, courts are not to defer uncritically to 
legislatures’ findings regarding the medical benefits of a particular law.25  
Seemingly uncomfortable with engaging in business as usual during a 
public health crisis, the courts also turned to Jacobson, a 1905 Supreme 
Court case involving a constitutional challenge to Massachusetts’s 
compulsory smallpox vaccination law. In Jacobson, the Court upheld the 
vaccination requirement, stating that courts normally lack “power . . . to 
review legislative action in respect of a matter affecting the general 
welfare,” except if the action “has no real or substantial relation to” public 
health, morals, or safety, or if the action “is, beyond all question, a plain, 
palpable invasion of rights secured by the [Constitution].”26 They treated 
Jacobson, which appears to apply highly deferential review to state 
action, as providing relevant doctrinal principles for defining the scope of 
constitutional rights during a public health emergency. 
However, it is not at all clear that Jacobson, a Lochner-era case 
considering the limits of the state’s police powers, has any application 
where an individual constitutional right is involved. Nor does it actually 
appear to be a case about emergency powers. The central question in 
Jacobson—which was decided long before the footnote in United States 
v. Carolene Products Co. urging heightened scrutiny for laws affecting 
fundamental rights27 and long before the Court recognized an individual 
right to bodily integrity and decisional autonomy—was simply whether a 
compulsory smallpox vaccination requirement fell within the scope of 
state power. In Jacobson, the Court was not faced with any specific claim 
of an individual constitutional right—just a generic appeal to Fourteenth-
Amendment “liberty.”28 At the turn of the twentieth century, state laws 
were often subject to scrutiny on the ground that they violated individual 
 
24 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. In June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo, 140 
S. Ct. 2103 (2020), the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana law that was virtually identical 
to the Texas law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health. Id. at __ (slip op. at 40). In so doing, a 
four-Justice plurality applied the balancing test set forth in Whole Woman’s Health. Id. at __ 
(slip op. at 2–3). Chief Justice Roberts, who provided the critical fifth vote, concurred 
separately and questioned the validity of requiring courts to consider an abortion restriction’s 
benefits in relation to its burdens. Id. at __ (slip op. at 2) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Thus, the 
balancing test set forth in Whole Woman’s Health remains intact for now, although there are 
clearly five Justices—Chief Justice Roberts plus the four other conservative Justices—who 
would like to abandon it. See id. at __ (slip op. at 1–2) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
25 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310. 
26 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905). 
27 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
28 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24, 26. 
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liberty and by the same token exceeded the extent of the state’s power to 
legislate in the interest of health or safety;29 Lochner-era substantive due 
process challenges thus generally asserted that a particular law was 
invalid because it was not actually a health law, or because it did not 
actually advance the state’s interest in health and safety.30 This claim did 
not turn at all on whether the law conflicted with the claimant’s 
constitutional rights. 
In addition, the scrutiny that the Court applied to the vaccination law 
in Jacobson was arguably stricter than its deferential language 
indicated.31 As Professor Scott Burris has pointed out, the Jacobson Court 
made reference to the wide and deep medical consensus around the safety 
and efficacy of vaccination, citing two pages’ worth of medical authority 
to that effect, in support of its finding that compulsory vaccination was an 
appropriate and legitimate health measure.32 Indeed, Jacobson has often 
been treated as a precedent about the limits on states’ public health 
powers, not a vindication of unlimited state emergency powers.33 
Moreover, if Jacobson was a case about the state’s expansive power in 
emergencies, as the states claimed in asserting their authority to ban or 
delay abortions in a public health emergency, it is not clear why 
vaccination mandates have continued to be upheld on Jacobson’s 
authority more than a century later, regardless of whether the mandate 
addresses an actual public health emergency.34  
 
29 See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the 
Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 476, 483 (1996) (“To [Justice 
Samuel] Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit states from exercising their police 
power. It only forbid them from exceeding that power.”); id. at 493 (“[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges [around the turn of the twentieth century] asserted . . . that the states 
were denying individual freedom and acting beyond the purview of government.”). 
30 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905). 
31 Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 933, 
961 (1989). Indeed, the application of fairly rigorous review in fact, while using the language 
of rational basis review, is arguably the hallmark of cases from the Lochner era. See David N. 
Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract During the 
Lochner Era, 36 Hastings Const. L.Q. 217, 262 (2009). 
32 Burris, supra note 31, at 961–62. 
33 James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: 
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 Ky. L.J. 831, 856–57 (2002) (deriving from 
Jacobson four limitations on the power of states to act in the interest of public health); cf. 
Parmet, supra note 29, at 493 (noting that “the concept of the police power” at the time of 
Jacobson “was used not only to define state power, but to limit it in the name of individual 
freedom”). 
34 For example, in Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 500 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012), the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied Jacobson to uphold a general vaccination 
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Nonetheless, all of the courts considering challenges to abortion 
restrictions during the pandemic applied Jacobson to some degree. Some 
courts appeared to understand Jacobson’s language as requiring a higher 
showing of unconstitutionality and a greater mismatch between means 
and ends than if only Casey and Whole Woman’s Health applied. For 
example, the Fifth Circuit treated Jacobson as requiring a form of 
arbitrariness review—a standard associated with rational basis scrutiny.35 
The Eighth Circuit also adopted this framework, suggesting that even an 
otherwise unconstitutional ban on all surgical abortions before viability 
might be constitutional in the context of a public health crisis.36 Similarly, 
the dissenting judge in the Sixth Circuit case read the “basic principle of 
Jacobson” to be “that states may respond to emergencies in the face of 
substantive-due-process rights, so long as they act reasonably and don’t 
single out specific rights or persons for disfavored treatment.”37 Judged 
against the correct understanding of Jacobson in its historical context, 
however, this treatment of the case as requiring an elevated showing of 
 
requirement for public schooling and observed that the case generally demonstrates that the 
state interest in protecting against communicable disease outweighs the individual’s interest 
in refusing unwanted medical interventions. Id. at 19 (citing Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., 
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)); see also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 
(1922) (relying on Jacobson for the proposition that “compulsory vaccination” is within a 
state’s “police power”); Wendy E. Parmet, Rediscovering Jacobson in the Era of COVID-19, 
100 B.U. L. Rev. Online 117, 127, 130–31 (2020) (demonstrating that Jacobson has not been 
applied, and was not meant to apply, only to emergencies or outbreaks). 
35 In re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696, 704–05, 716 (5th Cir. 2020); In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784 
(5th Cir. 2020); see also Parmet, supra note 34, at 118 (noting that the Fifth Circuit in Abbott 
treated Jacobson as “requir[ing] courts to limit their review of constitutional rights during a 
public health emergency”). 
36 In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2020). 
37 Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 934 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J., 
dissenting). Interestingly, in enjoining Kentucky’s ban on drive-in religious services during 
the pandemic, the Sixth Circuit glided past Jacobson without applying, or in fact even 
mentioning, the language that appeared to require a less stringent level of review. In fact, the 
court summed up the only paragraph in which it cited Jacobson with the Delphic assertion: 
“While the law may take periodic naps during a pandemic, we will not let it sleep through 
one.” Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 2020). 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a church’s request for emergency relief against 
California’s ban on larger in-person worship ceremonies. Concurring in the denial, Chief 
Justice Roberts cited Jacobson to suggest that the need for particular measures during a 
pandemic should be left primarily to the political process. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church 
v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh, 
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dissented from the denial without so much as mentioning 
Jacobson. Id. at 1614–15 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
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unconstitutionality or a less strict form of review for state orders in public 
health emergencies appears remarkably anachronistic. 
On the other hand, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits held that Jacobson’s 
language must be reconciled with the more recent cases identifying a 
constitutional right to access abortion. Under this framework, those courts 
held that the orders violated patients’ rights to access abortion.38 Perhaps 
implicitly recognizing that Casey and Whole Woman’s Health already 
required the court to balance state interests against individual rights, those 
courts focused on determining whether the burdens of the orders 
outweighed their benefits. This balancing test already required 
consideration of whether, to echo the language of Jacobson, the orders 
lacked a “substantial relation to” the public health goals they sought to 
advance.39 In other words, as the Sixth Circuit explained, “context 
matters.”40 In the context of a pandemic, the Whole Woman’s Health 
standard for deciding whether a burden is “undue” already allows courts 
to take into account the urgency and time-sensitivity of the state’s 
interests in preserving hospital capacity, maintaining the supply of PPE, 
and limiting in-person contact. The court must then balance those benefits 
against the burden on the individual’s right to access abortion—which, 
here, amounts to a total ban on abortion for the (possibly indefinite) 
duration of the orders. 
Regardless of whether Jacobson’s language should apply, courts 
should have concluded that the elective surgery orders were 
unconstitutional as applied to abortion. These orders could be viewed as 
either completely banning abortion or as delaying individual abortions for 
a period of weeks or more. Viewed as bans on abortion, the orders would 
unquestionably be unconstitutional; neither the Supreme Court nor any 
federal appellate court has, since Roe v. Wade,41 ever upheld a flat-out 
ban on abortion (as opposed to a regulation). Perhaps in order to avoid 
this clear precedent, some states argued that their orders required all 
abortions to be delayed during the pandemic except if the patient was 
nearing the gestational limit for obtaining a legal abortion (usually 
 
38 Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 927 (“[W]e will not countenance . . . the notion that COVID-
19 has somehow demoted Roe and Casey to second-class rights, enforceable against only the 
most extreme and outlandish violations.”); Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1182–83 
(11th Cir. 2020). 
39 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 19 (1905). 
40 Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 927. 
41 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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approximately 22–24 weeks of pregnancy).42 Even understood as delays, 
however, the orders would unquestionably and palpably amount to undue 
burdens on the abortion right under Casey and Whole Woman’s Health. 
Casey upheld a 24-hour waiting period for women seeking abortions, the 
purpose of which was to ensure women are able to reflect on their 
decisions, but found the constitutionality of that provision to be a “closer 
question” than the constitutionality of other restrictions.43 Given that the 
delays required by the COVID-19 pandemic would last weeks or longer, 
as explained below, the burdens on abortion access imposed by those bans 
outweigh the benefits by a substantial margin. 
Pregnancy progresses inevitably and relatively quickly, and while 
abortion is an extremely safe procedure, the risks associated with abortion 
increase later in the pregnancy—approximately 38% per week of delay.44 
In addition, more complex surgical procedures are required at later 
gestational stages, sometimes even necessitating surgical visits on two 
separate days to complete.45 Thus, at a minimum, the health risks are 
sufficiently grave if delaying an abortion would require a later and riskier 
procedure. In addition, however, every week of delay imposes 
unnecessary and therefore unacceptable health risks—especially since 
most courts were operating on the understanding that any patient who 
wanted an abortion had a right to receive one eventually, and thus that 
every abortion would still occur, but much later in the pregnancy.46 The 
increased health risks to patients are therefore a serious burden to be 
weighed against the questionable benefits.  
 
42 See, e.g., Adams & Boyle, 956 F.3d at 922; In re Abbott, 800 F. App’x 293, 296 (5th Cir. 
2020). 
43 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992). 
44 Linda A. Bartlett, Cynthia J. Berg, Holly B. Shulman, Suzanne B. Zane, Clarice A. Green, 
Sara Whitehead & Hani K. Atrash, Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality 
in the United States, 103 Obstetrics & Gynecology 729, 731 (2004). Carrying a pregnancy to 
term—a process that also generally involves medical intervention—is several times riskier 
than abortion; thus, arguably all abortions avert serious health risks. See Suzanne Zane, 
Andreea A. Creanga, Cynthia J. Berg, Karen Pazol, Danielle B. Suchdev, Denise J. Jamieson 
& William M. Callaghan, Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States 1998–2010, 126 
Obstetrics & Gynecology 258, 264 (2015), https://journals.lww.com/greenjournal/Fulltext/-
2015/08000/Abortion_Related_Mortality_in_the_United_States_.6.aspx [https://perma.cc/-
D8C3-3XMH]; CDC, Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System 2, https://www.cdc.gov/-
reproductivehealth/maternal-mortality/pregnancy-mortality-surveillance-system.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4A6P-9GNH].  
45 Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *7 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020); Bartlett et al., supra note 44, at 735. 
46 See sources cited supra note 42.  
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Those benefits were purported to be saving PPE, preserving hospital 
capacity, and minimizing personal contact. But given that under the 
states’ positions, pregnant people would be able to receive abortions 
eventually—just later than they wished to—these interests would not be 
served. The later procedures would use just as much or more PPE; the 
personal contact would still occur, and hospitalization—while always 
unlikely with an abortion, which is a safe outpatient procedure—would if 
anything be more likely the longer the person remained pregnant and the 
later and more complicated the abortion procedure became. Thus, the 
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits correctly held that the COVID abortion bans 
lacked a “substantial relation” to their public health goals and were 
“plain[ly and] palpab[ly]” unconstitutional under Whole Woman’s 
Health.47 
Ultimately, most of the litigation surrounding non-essential surgery 
orders has been mooted or otherwise fizzled out. Many states’ orders 
expired or else were replaced by more lenient orders that clearly allowed 
abortions to proceed along with most other outpatient surgeries.48 Thus, 
the legal issue has died down for now, although litigation will likely recur 
if a new wave of COVID cases leads to a short supply of PPE and hospital 
beds.49 But beyond its possible relevance to future litigation, the case law 
 
47 Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)). 
48 See, e.g., Ohio Dep’t of Health, Director’s Stay Safe Ohio Order 3 (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/publicorders/Directors-Stay-Safe-Ohio-Order.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JD5F-CKMC]; Tex. Governor Greg Abbott, Executive Order GA-15 (Apr. 
17, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-15_hospital_capacity_COVID-
19_TRANS_04-17-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYB7-L5T7] (allowing non-medically 
necessary surgeries to proceed if they would not deplete hospital capacity or PPE). One 
notable exception is Arkansas, which replaced its stringent ban on abortions not “necessary to 
protect the life or health of the patient” with an order, adopted April 27, 2020, allowing 
virtually all “elective” surgeries to proceed but requiring even asymptomatic patients to 
provide a negative test result for COVID-19 within 48 hours of the surgery. Although some 
health care facilities presumably have access to such tests, this requirement proved nearly 
impossible for abortion clinics to meet. Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, No. 
4:20-CV-00470, 2020 WL 2240105, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. May 7, 2020). 
49 In Texas, for example, the Governor rolled back the state’s reopening and imposed new 
restrictions on elective surgeries, although the new elective surgeries order appears not to 
apply to abortions. Emma Platoff, Texas Bans Elective Surgeries in More than 100 Counties 
as Coronavirus Hospitalizations Keep Climbing, Tex. Tribune (July 9, 2020), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/07/09/texas-coronavirus-hospitalizations-elective-surger-
ies/ [https://perma.cc/TS6H-8EM7]. Other states, too, have begun shutting down again in 
response to spikes in COVID-19 infection rates. See Jasmine C. Lee, Sarah Mervosh, Yuriria 
Avila, Barbara Harvey & Alex Leeds Matthews, See How All 50 States Are Reopening (and 
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arising out of the abortion restrictions adopted during the pandemic 
contains useful lessons about the rhetorical framing of abortion even 
during non-pandemic times.  
II. IDEOLOGY: THE LOGIC BEHIND THE COVID ABORTION BANS 
The fight over abortion access during the COVID-19 pandemic has 
roots that stretch back well before 2020. Since the Supreme Court 
recognized a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy in Roe v. Wade, 
a series of historical contingencies and intentional choices has led to 
abortions being provided primarily in freestanding clinics that are 
separate from “mainstream” medical institutions such as hospitals and 
physicians’ offices. This result has coincided with the development of a 
unique doctrinal framework for analyzing the constitutionality of abortion 
restrictions that is largely dissimilar to the framework for analyzing any 
other constitutional right, leading to the perception that abortion is sui 
generis in constitutional law.50 This evolution has produced two kinds of 
abortion exceptionalism that make a recognizable appearance in the 
COVID abortion ban cases: considering most abortions to be elective, 
unlike comparable medical procedures, and framing abortion providers’ 
requests for equal treatment as requests for special treatment. As I discuss 
in Part III, these phenomena are problematic for abortion doctrine, both 
within the pandemic-orders context and outside of it. 
A. “Elective” Abortion  
Most states’ orders temporarily banned “elective” or “non-essential” 
surgeries.51 Those terms were then further defined in the orders. Yet, 
 
Closing Again), N.Y. Times (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/-
2020/us/states-reopen-map-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/SD6T-NW7X]. 
50 I discuss this phenomenon in a forthcoming article. B. Jessie Hill, The Geography of 
Abortion Rights, 109 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 20–21, 21 n.97) (on file 
with author). 
51 The states temporarily banning “elective” surgeries were Arkansas, Iowa, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, and Tennessee. Arkansas Dep’t of Health, ADH Directive on Elective Surgeries 
(Apr. 3, 2020) (superseded Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.healthy.arkansas.gov/-
images/uploads/pdf/Elective_Procedure_Directive_April_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WBP-
K2K2]; Governor Kimberly K. Reynolds, Proclamation of Disaster Emergency (Mar. 26, 
2020) (superseded Apr. 24, 2020), https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/-
Public%20Health%20Proclamation%20-%202020.03.26.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDW8-CZ-
AW]; Ohio Dep’t of Health, Director’s Order for the Management of Non-Essential Surgeries 
and Procedures Throughout Ohio (Mar. 17, 2020) (rescinded Apr. 30, 2020), 
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because of this wording, anti-abortion officials were able to exploit a 
particular popular understanding of electiveness in the abortion context 
that would not apply to other medical procedures. 
Strictly speaking, in medical terminology an “elective” surgery is 
simply one that can be scheduled ahead of time, as opposed to one that is 
emergently performed.52 In popular parlance, by contrast, elective surgery 
is often understood to refer to procedures that are optional or not 
medically necessary, such as cosmetic surgery.53 Yet it does not appear 
that either meaning was intended by those orders banning “elective” 
surgeries. Instead, the orders often outlined specific factors to define what 
constitutes essential, non-elective surgery. Generally, those factors 
included time sensitivity and aggravation of an underlying condition—
thus allowing a range of procedures to go forward that would not 
necessarily qualify as emergent.54 
As used in the abortion context, the term “elective” has yet another 
meaning, which state officials appeared to rely upon in claiming they 
should not be performed during the pandemic. In the abortion context, 
“elective” almost always refers to those abortions that are not performed 
 
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/resources/public-health-orders/direc-
tors-order-non-essential-surgery-3-17-2020 [https://perma.cc/ZCT8-5GDU]; Okla. Exec. 
Order 2020-07 (Fourth Amended) (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/-
executive/1919.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAG4-KHP6]; Tenn. Exec. Order 25 (Apr. 8, 2020) 
(expired Apr. 30, 2020), https://publications.tnsosfiles.com/pub/execorders/exec-orders-
lee25.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5L3-N2SJ]. 
52 See, e.g., Michelle J. Bayefsky, Deborah Bartz & Katie L. Watson, Abortion During the 
Covid-19 Pandemic—Ensuring Access to an Essential Health Service, 382 New Eng. J. Med. 
e47(1), e47(2) (2020); Benjamin Elliot Yelnosky Smith, Deborah Bartz, Alisa B. Goldberg & 
Elizabeth Janiak, “Without Any Indication”: Stigma and a Hidden Curriculum Within Medical 
Students’ Discussion of Elective Abortion, 214 Soc. Sci. & Med. 26, 27 (2018) (“The word 
‘elective’ has had a consistent medical meaning since as early as 1936 when it was used to 
describe surgeries that could be planned rather than done emergently.”).  
53 Smith et al., supra note 52, at 27. 
54 See, e.g., Governor Kimberly K. Reynolds, supra note 51; Ohio Dep’t of Health, supra 
note 4. Those states that did not use the term “elective” applied a variety of standards to 
identify the procedures that would be banned. Alabama initially banned “elective” procedures 
but then amended that order to permit only those procedures “necessary to treat an emergency 
medical condition” or “necessary to avoid serious harm from an underlying condition or 
disease, or necessary as part of a patient’s ongoing and active treatment.” Robinson v. 
Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2020) (quoting 
Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Health, Order of the State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public 
Gatherings due to Risk of Infection by COVID-19 (Mar. 27, 2020) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). In Texas, the order allowed procedures to go forward if the patient would otherwise 
“be at risk for serious adverse medical consequences or death, as determined by the patient’s 
physician.” Tex. Governor Greg Abbott, supra note 4. 
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for a reason relating to a separate or underlying medical condition of the 
pregnant person or the fetus.55 Indeed, one study involving medical 
students planning to practice obstetrics and gynecology found that they 
used the term “elective” to contrast with medically necessary or medically 
indicated, by which they meant an abortion due to fetal anomaly or a 
separate health condition of the pregnant woman.56 
On this definition of electiveness, the overwhelming majority of 
abortions in the U.S. are elective. In a 2005 study, only 12% of women 
indicated that they were choosing abortion at least partially because of a 
possible health issue, and only 4% indicated that it was the most important 
reason.57 Another 13% indicated an issue with the health of the fetus 
factored into the decision, with only 3% stating it was the most important 
reason.58 Instead, most women choose abortion in response to an 
unintended pregnancy for reasons related to their unreadiness or inability 
to parent a child (or an additional child).59 
This problematic definition of “elective” abortion is a form of abortion 
exceptionalism, as it uniquely stigmatizes the abortion decision and 
adopts a concept of electiveness that would not apply to other surgeries. 
The notion that abortions chosen for particular reasons are somehow 
optional or non-therapeutic implies that the natural and expected course 
for all women and pregnant people is parenthood and that terminating a 
pregnancy is a “choice,” but continuing one is not. (We do not, for 
 
55 Smith et al., supra note 52, at 27; Katie Watson, Why We Should Stop Using the Term 
“Elective Abortion”, 20 AMA J. Ethics 1175, 1176 (2018). 
56 See Smith et al., supra note 52, at 29. Similarly, in a recent case involving a challenge to 
an ordinance that attempted to exclude surgical abortion clinics from operating within a 
particular city, the parties disputed whether abortion services fell within a zoning provision 
allowing for facilities providing outpatient services that were “therapeutic, preventative or 
correctional.” FemHealth USA, Inc. v. City of Mount Juliet, No. 3:19-CV-01141, 2020 WL 
2098234, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 1, 2020). Drawing a distinction between therapeutic medical 
procedures and those it presumably deemed elective, the City claimed “abortion . . . is not 
preventative. It is not correctional. There are therapeutic abortions where the life or health of 
the mother is at risk.” City of Mount Juliet’s Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 11, FemHealth USA, Inc. v. City of Mount Juliet, 2020 WL 2098234 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 
2020) (No. 3:19-CV-01141).  
57 Lawrence B. Finer, Lori F. Frohwirth, Lindsay A. Dauphinee, Susheela Singh & Ann M. 
Moore, Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 
Persp. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 110, 112–14 (2005). 
58 Id. Of course, as one scholar has pointed out, in another sense, “[e]very abortion is 
elective,” since even patients facing serious health risks can choose whether to have the 
procedure or undergo the risks to their health. Watson, supra note 55, at 1176. 
59 Finer et al., supra note 57, at 110–12. 
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example, generally speak of elective childbirth.) Indeed, the common 
rhetorical framing—or euphemizing—of the right to terminate a 
pregnancy as the “right to choose” may contribute to this unspoken 
understanding of abortion as a “choice.”60 This framing stigmatizes the 
decision to end a pregnancy, while failing to apply similar scrutiny to the 
decision to become a parent. And it assumes that an abortion is acceptable 
if it results from a wanted pregnancy “gone wrong,” but not if it results 
from a mistake or a so-called “social” reason.61 As Professor Katie 
Watson puts it, this framing valorizes “women who accept the social 
norms that women are meant to be mothers and that women cannot have 
sex solely for pleasure instead of for procreation.”62 As she further points 
out, we do not generally label knee replacement surgery, for example, as 
“elective” simply because it is a way of resisting the natural deterioration 
of the knee cartilage, and we do not pass judgment on the decision to seek 
that surgery or the reasons for it, even if certain individual choices, such 
as deciding to play sports, contributed to the patient’s predicament.63 
Thus, using the concept of “elective” abortion in its popular sense further 
emphasizes the separateness of abortion from health care generally and 
treats it as a moral choice, rather than as a medical decision.64 
Nonetheless, by relying on the meaning that the term “elective” usually 
has when it is applied to abortion, some states were able to clamp down 
on abortion access. In Texas and Oklahoma, for example, the state took 
the position that only abortions provided to avert a “medical emergency” 
could go forward.65 Similarly, in Tennessee, the order was interpreted to 
ban all surgical abortions except those “required to . . . prevent rapid 
deterioration or serious adverse consequences to a patient’s physical 
condition.”66 In Ohio, the state argued that the order allowed surgical 
abortions only to protect the patient’s life or health, or those that were 
 
60 Thanks to Jonathan Entin for pointing this out. 
61 See Smith et al., supra note 52, at 29. 
62 Watson, supra note 55, at 1178. 
63 Id. at 1175. 
64 Id.; see also Smith et al., supra note 52, at 26 (“‘Elective’ negatively marked and isolated 
some abortions, and participants used the term to convey judgement about patients’ social and 
reproductive histories.”). 
65 S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. 20-CV-00277, 2020 WL 1932900, at *3 (W.D. 
Okla. Apr. 20, 2020); Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-00323, 
2020 WL 1815587, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020). 
66 Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 931 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J., 
dissenting).  
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close to the legal limit for performing a pre-viability abortion.67 Similarly, 
the Eighth Circuit held that because medication abortions were allowed 
to proceed and because the clinics had not identified how many women 
would actually be affected by the ban (and therefore could not quantify 
the burden on abortion access), the “right to elective abortion”—meaning 
the right to reproductive autonomy—had not been clearly violated.68 
In addition to exploiting this unique definition of electiveness, anti-
abortion officials sometimes relied upon it to create uncertainty about the 
application of state orders in a way that put abortion clinics in a bind. In 
a number of cases, officials threatened enforcement actions while refusing 
to tell abortion clinics which abortions the state considered to be 
“elective” or medically unnecessary. In the case of Ohio, even after the 
clinics brought suit, the state refused to explain which abortions were 
permissible under the order—despite the fact that criminal penalties 
attached to a violation of the surgery order.69 Similarly, in Alabama, the 
district court observed that the meaning of the state’s order with respect 
to abortion “was not immediately clear,” and that, “[i]n part because 
abortion providers in Alabama operate in an atmosphere of hostility, the 
[clinics] sought clarification of whether the restrictions allow the 
continued performance of abortions.”70 The court further noted that 
“[r]epeated efforts to clarify the application of the medical restrictions to 
abortion, including by the plaintiffs and by [the] court . . . yielded 
multiple inconsistent interpretations” by the state.71 This refusal to 
provide clarity left the clinics vulnerable to various civil and criminal 
sanctions and naturally had a chilling effect on their willingness to 
perform abortions.  
Moreover, even in those states that specified a narrow understanding 
of which abortions qualified as medically necessary or non-elective, it 
was not self-evident what constituted a threat to a patient’s “health” or a 
“serious adverse consequence[] to a patient’s physical condition” in the 
 
67 Combined Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Merits Brief at 12–13, Yost 
v. Preterm-Cleveland, No. 20-3365 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2020).  
68 In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1028–32 (8th Cir. 2020). 
69 Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *4 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020). The state had also sent health inspectors to examine the records of three 
abortion clinics but never revealed whether it found any violations of the orders. Id. 
70 Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 
2020). 
71 Id. 
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context of abortion.72 For example, is the significantly increased risk 
brought about by any meaningful delay enough to qualify under this 
language?73 Or is something more required? Even outside the 
reproductive health context, medical necessity is a poorly defined concept 
that is often left to individual physicians to apply.74 The states that applied 
elective surgery bans to prohibit most or nearly all abortions—all of 
which had previously exhibited hostility to abortion rights—were able to 
exploit this underlying uncertainty.  
B. “Exempting” Abortion 
The abortion-specific understandings of electiveness and medical 
necessity also led some courts to see the plaintiffs’ claims for equal 
treatment with other health care providers as asking for an exemption 
under the orders. This framing of requests for equal treatment as requests 
for special treatment was also a form of abortion exceptionalism.75 
Because abortion is understood as uniquely medically unnecessary or 
optional, in a way that other medical procedures are not, the requests of 
abortion providers to be treated like other physicians providing essential 
services was seen as aberrational.   
Primarily, this reversal of plaintiffs’ claims for equal treatment took the 
form of state officials declining to afford abortion providers the sort of 
deference that other medical professionals likely would receive when 
deciding whether a surgery should proceed under the order. For example, 
in Alabama, state officials initially interpreted the surgery order to allow 
abortions only where necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
woman.76 After the state changed its position, the district court sought an 
assurance that “[t]he reasonable medical judgment of abortion providers 
will be treated with the same respect and deference as the judgments of 
other medical providers,” and that “[t]he decisions will not be singled out 
 
72 Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 931 (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J., 
dissenting). 
73 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
74 B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications of Defining 
“Medical Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 Am. 
J.L. & Med. 445, 450–57 (2012); Wendy K. Mariner, Patients’ Rights After Health Care 
Reform: Who Decides What Is Medically Necessary?, 84 Am. J. Pub. Health 1515, 1516–17 
(1994). 
75 See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
76 Robinson v. Marshall, No. 2:19-CV-00365, 2020 WL 1847128, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 
2020). 
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for adverse consequences because the services in question are abortions 
or abortion-related.”77 The state resisted this formulation, however, and 
refused to agree not to second-guess abortion providers’ decisions.78 
Similarly, in Ohio, the providers asked the court “for their case-by-case 
determinations regarding the essential nature of an abortion procedure to 
be treated the same as other Ohio healthcare professionals’ 
determinations regarding the essential nature of other procedures.”79 This 
equal treatment clearly had not been provided. For example, the state 
contended it had received complaints about three abortion clinics 
purportedly performing elective surgeries, as well as a similar complaint 
about a urology clinic. Yet, while Ohio sent inspectors to review the 
surgery records of the abortion clinics, there was no evidence it had taken 
any steps to investigate the urology clinic.80 In Texas, the state highlighted 
its tendency to view abortion as sui generis among medical procedures 
when answering a question posed to it in writing by the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. Trying to determine whether medication-only abortion was 
covered by the state order banning non-medically necessary procedures, 
the court asked the parties to explain “[w]hat medical acts should be 
considered analogous to medication abortion.”81 The State of Texas 
answered: “Medication abortions are unique. Petitioners are unaware of 
other procedures that involve the use of medication to achieve a medical 
result that is not tied to treating or managing a disease or harmful 
condition.”82 
Differential treatment of abortion providers is normalized by the stigma 
that permeates abortion provision, treats abortion services as outside of 
mainstream health care, and assumes almost all abortions are, by default, 
elective. Thus, the providers’ requests to be allowed to make their own 
determinations whether a particular surgery for a particular patient 
qualified as essential and non-elective were cast by states, and some 
courts, as requests for “blanket exemption[s].”83 In fact, in In re Rutledge, 
 
77 Id. at *4. 
78 Id. at *5. 
79 Preterm-Cleveland v. Att’y Gen., No. 1:19-CV-00360, 2020 WL 1957173, at *16 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 23, 2020). 
80 Id. at *16 n.19.  
81 Petitioners’ Letter Brief at 4, In re Abbott, No. 20-50296 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2020). 
82 Id. 
83 Preterm-Cleveland, 2020 WL 1957173, at *9; see also Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 
956 F.3d 913, 928 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he State suggests that if we permit this one exemption, 
surely the joint-replacement surgeons, the cataract-removal specialists, and every other 
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this abortion exceptionalism led the Eighth Circuit down a perplexingly 
incorrect doctrinal path. In determining whether Arkansas’s surgery order 
could be mobilized to ban all surgical abortions in the state, the court 
declined to consider whether the order violated the Constitution as applied 
to abortion; instead, it only considered whether the directive itself—
requiring suspension of all “elective” surgeries—was valid.84 The court 
asserted that it could not “take a piecemeal approach and scrutinize 
individual surgical procedures or otherwise create an exception for 
particular providers, such as those performing non-emergency, surgical 
abortions.”85 Not only does this formulation label nearly all abortions 
elective, but it also ignores the existence of the fundamental right to 
abortion and incorrectly applies Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, 
it ignores case law requiring courts to weigh the benefits and burdens of 
all restrictions on abortion as applied to abortion patients and providers—
even those arising from laws that do not single out abortion but instead 
apply to other procedures as well. For example, in Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt, the Court considered whether Texas’s surgical-center law 
unduly burdened abortion access, although that law applied to (and 
remained valid as applied to) facilities other than abortion clinics.86 But 
when the Eighth Circuit balanced benefits and burdens, it considered the 
benefits of the surgery order generally rather than with respect to abortion, 
stating that “the purpose of the . . . directive is to delay all non-emergency 
 
medical provider affected by EO-25’s bar on elective procedures will follow . . . .”); In re 
Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1032 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating that the district court’s order allowing 
abortions to proceed during the pandemic “bestow[ed] on [surgical] abortion providers a 
blanket exemption from a generally-applicable emergency public health measure” (quoting In 
re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 795 (5th Cir. 2020))). At the same time, abortion providers were 
uniquely disabled in many cases from pursuing measures that would allow them to conserve 
PPE and limit exposure, such as using telemedicine for providing medication abortion. While 
telemedicine has been available and encouraged during the pandemic for most procedures, 
state laws requiring in-person visits for abortion inhibited its expansion to abortion services. 
See Ushma D. Upadhyay & Daniel Grossman, Telemedicine for Medication Abortion, 100 
Contraception 351, 351 (2019). 
84 Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1028–29. 
85 Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).  
86 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2299, 2314 (2016), as revised (June 27, 2016); see also Women’s Med. 
Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 603 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The generally applicable and neutral 
regulation in this case (the transfer agreement requirement) affects an abortion clinic, which 
is unable to satisfy the regulation’s requirements. Therefore, Casey and other relevant case 
law regarding state restrictions on abortion apply.”); Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. 
v. Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[B]y requiring the plaintiff to undergo the 
CON review process, the defendants would impose a substantial and unconstitutional burden 
on the right of access to abortion.”). 
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surgeries so that the State may conserve its finite amount of PPE resources 
and limit social contact,” and that this purpose is advanced by the 
directive.87 It then weighed that general benefit against the specific burden 
on abortion rights.  
Because abortion is often burdened by facially neutral laws, and 
because undue-burden analysis requires courts to evaluate the specific 
benefits and burdens of a regulation as applied to abortion, this analysis 
is misguided. Moreover, it suggests that it would be singling out abortion 
for special treatment to consider the benefits of the law specifically as 
applied to abortion while declining to analyze the law in the same way 
with respect to other surgeries. But of course, other surgeries are not 
afforded the same constitutional protection as abortion, which has 
implications not just for pregnant people’s health, but also for their 
reproductive autonomy and their future.  
III. IMPLICATIONS 
Officials who interpreted their elective surgery orders to ban abortion 
were working with a unique understanding of electiveness, applicable 
only to abortion, that cast the request of abortion providers for equal 
treatment as a request for a special exemption. Yet, abortion can and 
should be understood as non-elective, or medically necessary, for several 
reasons. First, as noted above, carrying a pregnancy to term is 
significantly riskier than ending a pregnancy; moreover, even carrying a 
pregnancy substantially longer than necessary or longer than desired 
brings additional health risks.88 Second, abortion is the ultimate time-
sensitive procedure, since it may be sought only during a particular 
window (which is often shortened by state laws prohibiting abortions after 
a specific point in the pregnancy). Finally, seeking an abortion is an 
exercise of reproductive autonomy; an abortion may be necessary to a 
person’s quality of life and ability to function at home, at work, and in 
society at large—just as other surgical procedures may be. Like other 
health conditions, pregnancy is a condition that, if allowed to progress, 
will result in physical changes, health risks, and very long-term 
consequences for the patient.  
Of course, the person’s subjective attitude toward the pregnancy—
whether those physical changes and effects on their life are wanted or 
 
87 Rutledge, 956 F.3d at 1031. 
88 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
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unwanted—determines the medical appropriateness of abortion for them, 
just as an individual patient’s attitudes and values may determine the 
medical appropriateness of other medical interventions. But this fact does 
not imply that the pregnant person’s reasons for wanting or not wanting 
the abortion are relevant to its medical appropriateness—that is, to its 
“electiveness.”89 The decision not to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term 
is a medical decision to protect one’s health and one’s body against 
undesired physical changes that will have a lifelong impact.90 
This insight suggests that the framing of most, or even some, abortions 
as “elective” is deeply problematic. It not only stigmatizes the deeply 
considered decisions of patients, but it also distorts the doctrine, including 
by introducing abortion exceptionalism and uncertainty into the analysis 
of the surgery orders during the pandemic. Further, it aggravates the 
isolation of abortion providers from other health care providers, making 
it less likely that physicians will want to engage in abortion provision and 
leaving them more vulnerable to harassment and violence.91 
The alternative approach would be to integrate abortion into the health 
care framework by viewing patients’ abortion decisions as analogous to 
other patients’ health care decisions. This would also mean that 
reproductive-rights scholars and advocates should avoid the use of terms 
like “elective”—which possess no clear meaning, except in the most 
limited contexts, in any case—and avoid using the term “choice” as a 
stand-in for abortion or abortion rights.92 Moreover, abortion providers 
should be accorded the same respect as other health care providers, who 
were largely left alone during the pandemic to implement the orders 
through internal institutional policies that were not subjected to further 
review.  
One concern with suggesting that abortion should be treated like other 
medical decisions is that it implies a sort of “leveling down” of the 
 
89 See Katie Watson, Scarlet A: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Ordinary Abortion 170–74 
(2018) [hereinafter Watson, Scarlet A]; Watson, supra note 55. 
90 As Professor Katie Watson and others have observed, the debate over when abortion is 
appropriate is thus really a debate about the moral value of the embryo or fetus vis-à-vis that 
of the woman. See, e.g., Watson, Scarlet A, supra note 89, at 173–74. I agree with this view 
but do not address that second question, regarding the moral status of the embryo or fetus, 
here since it is separate from the question of when, if ever, abortion is “elective” or medically 
unnecessary.  
91 See Hill, The Geography of Abortion Rights, supra note 50, at 24. 
92 Cf. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-constitutionalizing Abortion 
Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1410–11 (2009) (critiquing the rhetoric of choice on other 
grounds). 
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abortion right, insofar as other health care procedures do not generally 
enjoy the same constitutional protection as abortion. Indeed, the fact that 
abortion implicates reproductive autonomy—a constitutionally protected 
interest—implies that it should be singled out for especially favorable 
treatment, not unfavorable treatment, as compared to similar procedures. 
Yet, as the course of events during the COVID-19 pandemic has 
illustrated, other health care providers and procedures are more likely to 
be protected by the political process. Indeed, the repeal of elective-
surgeries bans that largely ended the abortion-related litigation were 
likely motivated by concerns of hospitals and patients seeking other kinds 
of procedures.93 News stories detailed the negative effects that elective 
surgery bans were having on patients as well as on the bottom lines of 
hospitals.94 Those hospitals have enormous political clout.95 Thus, if the 
interests of abortion providers and clinics were taken into account in the 
same way as those of other health care providers, and if they were 
considered an integral part of that larger group, they might be afforded 
the same degree of deference with respect to their decision making. In 
addition, as Professor Robin West has argued,96 it is possible that 
engaging the political process rather than relying solely on courts for 
protection of abortion rights could, in the long run, enable a political 
discourse that argues for certain rights and benefits that cannot be 
accommodated within the current reproductive-rights framework—
 
93 See, e.g., Laura Garcia, San Antonio Hospitals Could Resume Elective Surgeries  
Under Abbott’s New Order, San Antonio Express-News (Apr. 18, 2020), 
https://www.expressnews.com/business/health-care/article/San-Antonio-hospitals-could-
resume-elective-15209439.php [https://perma.cc/X7V5-2WPN]. 
94 Id.; see also Jenny Gold, Some Hospitals Continue with Elective Surgeries Despite 
COVID-19 Crisis, Kaiser Health News (Mar. 20, 2020), https://khn.org/news/some-hospitals-
continue-with-elective-surgeries-despite-covid-19-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/VA9Q-SZ6L] 
(explaining the difficult financial calculus faced by hospitals in deciding whether to shut down 
elective surgeries in order to maintain public safety); C.J. LeMaster, Ban on Elective 
Procedures/Surgeries Impacts Rural Hospitals Already at Risk of Closure, WLOX (Apr. 21, 
2020), wlox.com/2020/04/21/ban-elective-proceduressurgeries-impacts-rural-hospitals-alrea-
dy-risk-closure/ (detailing rural Mississippi hospital kept afloat by elective surgeries).  
95 See generally Steven I. Weissman, Remedies for an Epidemic of Medical Provider Price 
Gouging, Fla. Bar J. 23, 28, 28 n.55 (Feb. 2016) (noting that medical industry lobbying 
expenditures exceeded those of the defense, aerospace, oil, and gas industries combined); 
Jennifer Haberkorn, Hospitals Flex Lobbying Muscle, Politico (Jan. 7, 2013), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/hospitals-flex-lobbying-muscle-to-bypass-some-
cuts-085814 [https://perma.cc/R8TV-EHC8] (“Hospitals have some of the strongest lobbying 
muscle because every member of Congress has at least one in their district. They don’t just 
provide needed health care but are typically one of the largest employers, too.”).  
96 See West, supra note 92, at 1412–21. 
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including a right to positive goods like child care, health care, and 
protection from intimate violence, all of which are necessary for full 
reproductive dignity and autonomy. 
On the other hand, it is possible that all health care should share a 
degree of constitutional protection. While it has largely been unnecessary 
to protect access to other medical procedures with a constitutional right, 
since legislators rarely see political benefits in attacking orthopedic 
surgery or restricting access to heart medications, there may nonetheless 
be constitutional limits on the extent to which the government can 
interfere in private health care decisions.97 At a minimum, there is already 
a constitutionally protected right to make certain significant medical 
decisions, such as refusing treatment and accessing medication for severe 
pain.98  
The rhetorical integration of abortion into health care may be a part of 
a post-Roe v. Wade strategy as well. If Roe v. Wade is one day overruled, 
and the permissibility of abortion is left to individual states, it is possible 
that some states will consider adopting bans on so-called elective abortion 
while permitting medically necessary abortions.99 A robust understanding 
of abortion as medically necessary could be useful in combatting attempts 
to cabin abortion access in this way, either by making it unthinkable in 
some states to separate out so-called therapeutic from non-therapeutic 
abortions, or by bolstering the authority of individual patients and 
physicians to make decisions about which abortions are “medically 
necessary,” without second-guessing from the state. If abortion providers 
could draw on the political power of the broader health care community, 
it would also be more likely that abortion access would remain protected 
in a post-Roe world. 
CONCLUSION 
The litigation over the application of non-essential surgery bans 
exemplifies underlying tensions in the legal and popular understandings 
 
97 This argument is made at greater length in B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right To 
Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 277, 313–18 
(2007). 
98 Id. at 329–32.  
99 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a 
Post-Roe World, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 611, 626 (2007) (noting that the question of whether a 
state could regulate abortion even when it poses risks to the woman’s health would still arise 
in a post-Roe world). 
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of abortion that are likely to have an impact beyond the end of the 
pandemic. Access to abortion is threatened by a tendency to single out 
abortion for uniquely unfavorable treatment within both law and 
medicine. Long-term protection of abortion rights could be advanced 
through rhetorical reframing of abortion and bolstering an understanding 
of abortion as a medically necessary and appropriate health care decision, 
regardless of the patient’s reason for choosing it. 
 
